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The Other Side of a Slap in the Face: 
Judgement and the Ambiguities of 
Violence in Holocaust Testimony 
 







At the first blow [...] trust in the world breaks down. The other person, 
opposite whom I exist physically in the world and with whom I can exist 
only as long as he [sic] does not touch my skin surface as border, forces 
his own corporeality on me with the first blow. He is on me and 
thereby destroys me.1 
 
The passage above, taken from the influential philosophical testimony 
of Jean Améry, reflects on the author’s wartime torture at the hands of the 
Gestapo – an experience that, at least in part (in addition to his later 
imprisonment in Auschwitz), led to his suicide in 1978. Nazi violence, its 
motivations, and effects have preoccupied historians, philosophers, and 
psychologists for decades. This paper focuses on the related though 
considerably different issue of the violence of victims toward other victims 
which resulted from the Nazis’ extensive use of racialised prisoner hierarchies 
in the concentration camps, as well as employment of ‘privileged’ positions that 
further encouraged antagonism, if not physical violence. This complex and 
sensitive issue has remained largely taboo, though it is fundamental to 
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deepening understandings of the Holocaust and what it revealed about human 
behaviour in extremis. 
Numerous Holocaust testimonies describe incidents when prisoners 
around them were beaten and sometimes killed by functionaries appointed by 
the Nazi German perpetrators in concentration camps and ghettos. Inevitably – 
and understandably – such accounts generally condemn this behaviour, passing 
strong moral judgements on victims who (to use the most frequently adopted 
term) ‘collaborated’ with the enemy. Indeed, distinctions between ‘privileged’ 
prisoners and perpetrators of genocide are not always clear, but are oftentimes 
blurred, with many prisoners rarely seeing SS officers but constantly coming 
face-to-face with prisoner Kapos (‘chiefs’) of forced labour squads or the 
Ordnungsdienst (‘Order Service’, or Jewish police) patrolling the streets of the 
ghettos. As a result, the vexed themes of moral ambiguity and ‘compromise’ 
permeate the Holocaust, with significant and ethically fraught implications for 
representation and judgement. This problem is spelt out in Auschwitz survivor 
Primo Levi’s paradigmatic essay on the ‘grey zone’, in which he argues that 
moral evaluations of victims who were forced to cooperate with their 
persecutors should be suspended. Taking Levi’s ‘grey zone’ as a point of 
departure, this paper responds to a gap in the critical literature by closely 
analysing Holocaust testimonies written by (former) ‘privileged’ Jews 
themselves: Calel Perechodnik’s Am I a Murderer?: Testament of a Jewish 
Ghetto Policeman (1993) and Paul Steinberg’s Speak You Also: A Survivor’s 
Reckoning (1996).2 Positioning the problems of judgement and representation 
as pivotal to ethically engaging with victim behaviour in extremis, we reveal 
that considerable light can be shed on the complexity of Holocaust violence by 
exploring texts that engage with these issues. 
 
Negotiating the ‘Grey Zone’: The Abused, the Abuser, and the Ethics 
of (Engaging with) Holocaust Testimony 
 
During his time in Auschwitz between 22 February 1944 and 27 January 1945, 
Primo Levi was exposed to harsh and dehumanising conditions, enduring 
manual labour for many months before obtaining a specialist position in a 
chemical laboratory that helped, along with several other factors (not least of 
all, chance), save his life. He took mental notes of everything he could, 
preserving detailed memories of the minutiae of camp life that would form the 
backbone of his memoirs.3 While he felt that his writing helped him to come to 
terms with his traumatic wartime experiences to some degree, one issue in 
particular seems to have perturbed him for decades. In a 1975 foreword to his 
translation of Jacques Presser’s Dutch novel, The Night of the Girondists, 
focusing on a young Dutch Jew who helps the Nazis deport fellow Jews to 
Auschwitz, Levi wrote: 
 
There are enough signs to indicate that the time has come to explore 
the space that divides the victims from their executioners, and to go 
about it with considerably more delicacy and clearsightedness than has 
been evident, for instance, in certain well-known recent films. It would 
take a Manichean to argue that such a space is empty. Empty it is not: it 
is studded with sordid, deplorable or pathetic creatures (occasionally 
the three at once).4 
 
This provides an early formulation of Levi’s ‘grey zone’, and highlights several 
pertinent points that became even more crucial to his later writings.  
The provocative delineation of a ‘space’ situated between the categories 
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of persecuted and persecutors underlines the sensitive nature of the task Levi 
took upon himself, and he was often accused of unethically blurring these 
categories. Prominent survivor Elie Wiesel, who was for a time in the same 
camp barracks as Levi, strongly criticised him for ‘attenuating the guilt of the 
killers’: ‘I thought [Levi] too severe with survivors. There our disagreement was 
total, he ascribed too much guilt to them.’5 Yet we argue that this criticism 
derives from a misreading of Levi’s essay, which stresses at frequent intervals 
the necessity of maintaining the fundamental distinction between victim and 
perpetrator. 6  Indeed, in ‘The Grey Zone’ Levi is preoccupied with the 
inappropriateness of judging ‘privileged’ Jews. Regarding both his essay’s major 
case studies – the Sonderkommandos (‘special squads’) forced to work in the 
gas chambers and crematoria of Auschwitz, and Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski, 
the controversial Judenrat (Jewish council) leader of the Lodz Ghetto – Levi 
argues that one must suspend judgement of their activities. Yet if judgement of 
liminal figures is inevitable, as well as ‘impossible’, it is because the nature of 
language itself guarantees this. Even a seemingly simple statement, such as 
claiming that a ‘privileged’ prisoner ‘committed a violent act’, sounds like a 
legal pronouncement and therefore evokes criminal connotations. The 
connotations of ‘privileged’ itself must be qualified by inverted commas. This 
raises crucial questions: if ‘privileged’ Jews are not to be judged for their 
behaviour in situations beyond their control, how can/should their experiences 
be represented? And when these experiences include violent acts against fellow 
victims, how can distinctions between groups of victims – those with 
‘privileged’ positions and those without – be drawn without undermining the 
crucial separation of victims from persecutors? 
The category of ‘privileged’ Jews includes those prisoners in the Nazi-
controlled camps and ghettos who held positions that gave them access to 
material and other benefits beyond those available to other Jews.7 These figures 
were under extreme levels of coercion, compelled to act in ways some have 
judged to be both self-serving and harmful to fellow inmates. Important to note 
is that ‘privilege’ could only prolong their lives temporarily – all Jews were 
intended to die in the Holocaust. Nevertheless, maintaining one’s life-
prolonging ‘privileged’ position often involved a perceived or actual need (or, as 
some survivors note, opportunity) to engage in violence against other prisoners. 
Such behaviour, influenced by unprecedented Nazi persecution and potentially 
diminishing the chances of other victims’ survival, can neither be demonised as 
barbaric nor glorified as heroic. As Levi implies in the passage quoted above - 
and as he explicitly states in his later essay on the ‘grey zone’ – ‘privileged’ Jews’ 
circumstances cannot be understood via the widespread Manichean tendency 
towards simplistic binary oppositions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, 
shunning the ‘half-tints and complexities’ – the greyness – of human 
behaviour. 8  Levi viewed this tendency as particularly relevant to 
representations of the Holocaust in fiction films, although recent research 
highlights that similar judgements can be found across video testimonies, 
historical writing, and documentaries.9 The negotiation of this issue in the 
immense and diverse range of survivors’ written accounts, however, has on the 
whole been neglected.  
Toward the end of ‘The Grey Zone,’ Levi raises a crucial point that 
cannot be easily set aside: like most ‘privileged’ Jews, the only words about 
Rumkowski that we lack and can never obtain are his own. Levi writes that only 
Rumkowski could clarify his situation ‘if he could speak before us, even lying, as 
perhaps he always lied, to himself also; he would in any case help us understand 
him, as every defendant helps his judge.’10 The same problem is apparent in the 
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case of the Sonderkommandos, whom Levi also highlighted as centrally located 
in the ‘grey zone.’ Very few of these traumatised men survived the Holocaust 
and fewer still have spoken of their experiences or written memoirs. A small 
number of survivors have told how, under threat – and reality – of imminent 
death (each ‘special squad’ was killed after several weeks), the crematorium 
workers were forced to deceive and guide other victims toward the gas, sort 
their belongings, and later clean the chambers and burn the bodies. While these 
men gained access to several material benefits for their cooperation, Levi notes 
that ‘here one hesitates to speak of privilege.’ 11  While it should be 
acknowledged that even in the charnel houses of the death camps, some 
gestures of resistance were possible – several photographs were taken of an 
outdoor pyre used to cremate bodies and an armed revolt destroyed a 
crematorium on 7 October 1944 – the desperate situation of the 
Sonderkommandos cannot be stressed enough. Filip Müller, a Slovakian Jew 
incarcerated in Auschwitz from April 1942 to November 1944 and a survivor of 
the Sonderkommandos, sums this up in his memoir: ‘Any refusal to work, even 
the merest hint, would have meant certain death without the slightest effect on 
the course of events.’12 Faced with the problem of how to understand such 
extreme circumstances, it has been the ongoing task of the scholar to piece 
together the debris of the past to approach a better understanding of it. 
Judgement plays a crucial role in this. By explicitly and self-reflexively engaging 
with this complex issue, Levi invokes the need to suspend judgement when 
representing ‘privileged’ Jews, yet (mostly negative) evaluations of their 
behaviour are evident across countless texts.  
Returning to Améry’s personal reflections in At the Mind’s Limits: 
Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities (1980), at one 
point his focus on Nazi violence turns briefly to violence directed at him by a 
‘privileged’ prisoner-functionary in Buna-Monowitz (the same part of 
Auschwitz where Levi and Wiesel were incarcerated). In the context of the 
need to re-assert one’s dignity through resistance, Améry writes: 
 
Before me I see the prisoner foreman Juszek, a Polish professional 
criminal of horrifying vigor. In Auschwitz he once hit me in the face 
because of a trifle; that is how he was used to dealing with all the Jews 
under his command. At this moment – I felt it with piercing clarity – it 
was up to me to go a step further in my prolonged appeals case against 
society. In open revolt I struck Juszek in the face in turn. My human 
dignity lay in this punch to his jaw – and that it was in the end I, the 
physically much weaker man, who succumbed and was woefully 
thrashed, meant nothing to me. Painfully beaten, I was satisfied with 
myself.13 
 
Of course, Améry is in no way obligated to explore the situation from his 
abuser’s perspective – suggesting otherwise would be perverse – however, the 
picture the survivor evokes cannot be filled out in its entirety without 
considering how one might perceive and position the ‘privileged’ prisoner. That 
Juszek’s act can be described as ‘violent’ is undeniable, as is the fact that 
Améry’s use of violence to re-assert himself ‘in the world’ is a different kind of 
violence from Juszek’s. Nevertheless, important questions remain: what role 
and culpability in Juszek’s behaviour can be allocated to the Nazi perpetrator’s 
establishment of the ‘divide and conquer’ camp system? How is Juszek’s 
situation to be considered, given that ‘privileged’ positions were not necessarily 
permanent and often depended on keeping ‘order’ among the prisoners they 
were held responsible for, through the threat of severe punishment? Are there 
extenuating factors, and should these be considered? How does one 
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differentiate and hold in balance the perspectives of the abused and the abuser 
without trivialising such trauma and violence and, as a result, banalising the 
horrific settings of the camps and ghettos? Such questions are not raised to 
trivialise Améry’s suffering or expression of reignited dignity, nor are they to 
blindly excuse Juszek’s behaviour (certainly survivors remember camp 
prisoners incarcerated for past criminal activities least sympathetically), but 
these questions pose additional dilemmas to Améry’s meditation on his 
confrontation with his ‘opponent’.14 
‘Privileged’ prisoners acted in various ways, for various reasons and 
under varying levels of coercion. With agency and thus accountability difficult 
– if not impossible – to evaluate, at such a distance of time and experience (and 
arguably even without this), it is problematic for anyone to evaluate the 
consequences, motivations and personal autonomy that were in play during the 
Holocaust. Questions of judgement and representation in relation to the 
violence inflicted by ‘privileged’ prisoners on other prisoners are perhaps even 
more vexed when the ‘privileged’ prisoners are Jewish – thus occupying the 
lowest and most vulnerable rung of the imposed camp hierarchy (and hence 
more at risk of losing such positions). Yet negative judgements regarding the 
cooperation of ‘privileged’ Jews are common. For example, Chaim Rumkowski 
(mentioned above) – arguably the most despised Jewish leader in Holocaust 
testimony – makes frequent, and generally unsympathetic, appearances in 
Abraham Biderman’s The World of my Past (1995) and Jacob Rosenberg’s East 
of Time (2005), although both authors incorporate brief reflections on the 
impossible situation he faced and the difficulty in judging him. 15  Lucille 
Eichengreen, on the other hand, dedicates her memoir Rumkowski and the 
Orphans of Lodz (2000) to condemning Rumkowski as a tyrant who abused his 
power at every turn.16 
While a vast and ever-growing literature explores the genre of Holocaust 
testimony,17 this issue has received little attention in relation to ‘privileged’ 
Jews, particularly in relation to firsthand accounts by ‘privileged’ Jews 
themselves. These testimonies include Miklos Nyiszli’s memoir about his 
experiences performing autopsies for Josef Mengele’s pseudo-scientific 
experiments in Auschwitz-Birkenau; Gisella Perl’s account of her time as a 
prisoner-doctor in the same camp, performing covert abortions to save 
prisoners from the gas chambers while working with Mengele; and Jewish 
leader Adam Czerniakow’s painstakingly-compiled diary entries of his daily 
struggles to manage the operation of the Warsaw Ghetto. 18  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, such accounts are rare, due to either very low survival rate 
among even ‘privileged’ prisoners or their reticence at telling their stories for 
fear of self-incrimination or even revenge. Yet these accounts provide 
unparalleled insights into the extreme double binds they encountered and how 
they dealt with being situated (or ‘trapped’, if this is not too positive a 
judgement) between the Nazi guards and bureaucrats ‘above’ them and the 
Jewish prisoners ‘below’ them. Exemplifying what Lawrence Langer has termed 
‘choiceless choices’ (a concept frequently connected with Levi’s ‘grey zone’),19 
the memoir of Ella Lingens-Reiner, a German political inmate and prisoner-
doctor, reflects on the dilemma she faced in trying to use her ‘privileged’ 
position in the Auschwitz women’s camp to help others amidst the Nazis’ 
obsession with numbers: ‘If I rescued one woman, I pushed another to her 
doom, another who wanted to live and had an equal right to live … Was there 
any sense in trying to behave decently?’20 This example points to the fraught 
nature of classifying victim behaviour under Nazi persecution: is an attempted 
‘rescue’ like Lingens-Reiner describes a heroic act? Does it involve a form of 
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indirect violence to the prisoner who is chosen for the gas chambers instead? 
And what exactly does violence mean in an unprecedented situation like this? 
Notably, Levi himself emphasises on numerous occasions the ambiguous 
nature of violence between prisoners of different ‘rank’. He writes that due to 
language barriers among prisoners of distinct nationalities, Kapo beatings were 
often ambiguous, as they could be interpreted as an almost ‘friendly’ incitement 
to work, a warning, punishment or as completely senseless.21 In a short story, 
‘The Juggler’, Levi reflects at length on being ‘slammed to the ground with a 
violent slap’ by Eddy, a criminal prisoner and Kapo’s assistant, when he is 
caught writing a letter in the Buna-Monowitz (Auschwitz III) labour camp.22 
Rather than be offended, Levi reads Eddy’s strike as life-saving friendliness akin 
to a ‘friendly smack you give a dog’, given that Eddy did not turn him in to the 
SS for an almost certain death sentence. Levi writes: 
 
A slap inflicted in the Camp had a very different significance from what 
it might have here among us in today’s here and now. Precisely: it had a 
meaning; it was simply another way of expressing oneself. [...] punches 
and slaps passed among us as daily language, and we soon learned to 
distinguish meaningful blows from the others inflicted out of savagery, to 
create pain and humiliation, and which often result in death.23 
 
While there were undoubtedly less ambiguous forms of violence, this 
underlines the difficulty prisoners might themselves have had – much less 
contemporary readers of their testimonies – in interpreting ‘privileged’ 
prisoners’ behaviour. 
While we principally focus here on violence as the (more conventionally 
conceived) rendering of an injurious act by one person onto another, the 
concept of ‘violence’ in relation to the issue of ‘privileged’ Jews takes on a 
multiplicity of guises. In addition to (physical) violence against the body, 
emotional or psychological violence can be done through threats and trauma 
experienced in a dehumanising setting such as a concentration camp and 
ghetto. Further, in a more rhetorical sense, ‘violence’ can be inflicted through 
representation. The ambiguities of violence in relation to ‘privileged’ Jews can 
encompass all of these forms, as our analysis of major case studies illustrates. 
Indeed, these forms are closely interconnected, for a physical act of violence 
toward another can (and, in this context, frequently did) translate into trauma 
for the abuser as well as the abused. Any attempt to depict such an exchange – 
particularly between victims in the extreme, Nazi-created and controlled 
circumstances of the Holocaust (which can never be fully captured in its 
‘unrepresentability’) does a degree of ‘violence’ to both: the experiences of 
abused and abuser must be simplified through language to be understood, with 
judgement playing a fundamental role in this process. Indeed, Levi himself 
demonstrated his awareness of this in a 1975 interview, when he declared: ‘a 
human being is a “unique,” complicated object. When that object is reduced to 
a page, even by the best writers, it’s reduced to a skeleton’.24 Thus the issue(s) 
of violence regarding ‘privileged’ Jews must be approached – like the Holocaust 
in general – with due care. 
In the following sections, we analyse various ways in which ‘privileged’ 
Jews recount particular acts of violence – sometimes their colleagues’, 
sometimes their own – and consider the implications for engaging with their 
testimonies. Most violence in such accounts is, of course, committed by Nazi 
perpetrators and collaborators, who also bear moral responsibility for their 
victims’ behaviour, though limitations of space do not allow for a detailed 
comparison here. Fluctuating between lamentations and attempts to 
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rehabilitate themselves, testimonies of former ‘privileged’ prisoners encompass 
self-justifications, self-accusations – even self-hatred – disrupting conventional 
modes of identification and complicating the reading process. This signals the 
centrally important, though difficult to articulate, ethics of reading Holocaust 
testimony. As Dominick LaCapra emphasises in his chapter, ‘Holocaust 
Testimonies: Attending to the Victim’s Voice’, a key issue to reflect on in 
relation to testimony is how to ‘come to terms with affect in those who have 
been victimized and traumatized by their experiences, a problem that involves 
the tense relation between procedures of objective reconstruction of the past 
and empathic response, especially in the case of victims and survivors’.25 This 
tension is particularly acute when confronting the behaviour of ‘privileged’ 
prisoners, which (following Levi) must not be condemned or condoned. Yet 
readers must also respect the trauma ‘privileged’ Jews themselves endured – 
trauma invariably spelt out in detail throughout their testimonies. 
Robert Rozett writes that Jewish witnesses’ firsthand accounts cannot 
clarify the Nazis’ motives or plans, but ‘can only teach us about the effect of the 
horror on the individual victims and the experiences of the victims facing the 
horror’. 26 This acknowledgement of perspective does not detract from the 
crucial importance of survivor accounts; however, an awareness of the 
subjective nature of diaries, memoirs, and oral testimonies raises important 
ethical questions when considering how survivors represent their own or 
others’ experiences. In investigating this issue, we take a ‘metaethical’ 
approach. John K. Roth defines ‘metaethics’ as a reflection on judgements that 
have already been made, which ‘seek[s] to understand more fully how those 
judgments work as well as what limits they face and problems they entail’.27 In 
this manner, the problem of judgement, the ambiguities of violence, and the 
complexities of the often violent relationship between ‘abused’ and ‘abuser’ in 
Levi’s ‘grey zone’ become most apparent. We turn first to the posthumously 
published diary of Calel Perechodnik, a member of the Otwock Ghetto’s Jewish 
police. 
 
‘I don’t ask to be absolved’: Calel Perechodnik  
 
Jews became members of the Ordnungsdienst by volunteering, having 
advantageous contacts, or being randomly conscripted by Nazi authorities. 
Armed with truncheons and sometimes whips, Jewish police were charged with 
keeping order in the ghettos; enforcing Nazi regulations; guarding fences and 
Judenrat institutions; collecting property confiscated by the SS; and, most 
controversially, escorting fellow Jews, sometimes through violent means, to the 
trains bound for extermination camps.28 Further exemplifying the ‘choiceless 
choices’ at the centre of Levi’s ‘grey zone’, Jewish police often had to arrest a 
daily ‘quota’ of people for deportation lest they and their families suffer the 
same fate. Armed Germans or collaborators always supervised their activities to 
ensure that they behaved as expected and with the required violence. Being in 
the Ordnungsdienst had the potential to prolong life through extra food, 
freedom of movement, exemptions from searches and evictions, and (initially) 
immunity from deportation; however, it is crucial to remember that the ghettos 
were only established as a temporary measure. Ultimately, most Jewish police – 
like the majority of other ‘privileged’ Jews – did not survive the Holocaust. 
For perhaps predictable reasons, members of the Jewish police who did 
survive rarely left firsthand accounts, therefore the manuscript of Calel 
Perchodnik is a highly significant primary source text.29 The sensitive nature of 
its subject matter is evidenced in the fact that publication was delayed until 
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1993, at least in part because it eschews ‘the comforting rhetoric of heroism’.30 
Indeed, the narrative’s focus on what has often been interpreted as ‘Jewish 
complicity’ in their own persecution is reinforced through Perechodnik’s own 
condemnation of Jewish leaders and institutions. The author’s own activities 
drew immediate criticism from the reading public, including the manuscript’s 
Polish editor, who labelled Perechodnik a ‘collaborator’.31 Drawing on Levi’s 
‘grey zone’, Frank Fox counters these judgements in the text’s English 
translation: ‘To say that Perechodnik was a collaborator in extermination, a 
tormentor, or a perpetrator is a judgment we should hesitate to make. Most of 
the Jewish policemen were eventually killed, though not because of their deeds. 
They were killed because they were Jews’. 32  Fox’s self-reflexive foreword 
provides important context for reading the manuscript; nonetheless, some of 
the sentiments Perechodnik expresses will inevitably unsettle its audience – 
from his disgust at Jewish responses to his virulent desire for revenge.33  
In 1941, in order to avoid the roundups for labour camps, Perechodnik – 
then 27 years old – became a member of the ghetto police in Otwock, near 
Warsaw, capital of then Nazi-occupied Poland. He survived the Ghetto’s 
liquidation to escape and join the Polish underground, but soon developed 
typhus and was discharged. Dying in 1944, he most likely committed suicide 
using cyanide pills when his hiding place was discovered, hence the manuscript 
cannot even be considered ‘survivor testimony’. Indeed, Perechodnik depicts 
himself as a broken, almost lifeless, man from the beginning of his account, 
which he wrote while in hiding on the ‘Aryan side’. Fully expecting to be 
captured and killed before the war’s end, Perechodnik declares in a preface he 
wrote on 7 May 1943: 
 
To be exact, this is a confession about my lifetime, a sincere and true 
confession. Alas, I don’t believe in divine absolution, and as far as others 
are concerned, only my wife could – although she shouldn’t – absolve 
me. However, she is no longer among the living. She was killed as a 
result of German brutality, and, to a considerable extent, on account of 
my recklessness. Please consider this my deathbed confession. […] I 
don’t ask to be absolved.34 
 
While self-reproach for the violence done to his wife and others is perhaps 
understandable under the circumstances (yet to be revealed to the reader), it 
might be argued that such remorse is the result of the coercive actions of the 
Nazi German perpetrators and no cause for moral condemnation on 
Perechodnik’s part. In fact, the reader is confronted with similar statements 
elsewhere in the manuscript, establishing an important framework through 
which to view the activities of the Jewish police. 
In terms of Perechodnik’s depiction of physical violence inflicted by 
‘privileged’ Jews on other ghetto inhabitants, this is seldom described explicitly 
but can occasionally be read into his frequent and strong accusations against his 
colleagues. On the subject of rounding up the Jews for labour camps, 
Perechodnik notes that his own activities were restricted to distributing bread 
to wealthy, ‘privileged’ Jews: ‘I didn’t go out to seize people because I found it 
unbecoming, I was afraid of what people would say.  In any case, I did not have 
the “sporting instinct” for that’.35 While survivor accounts are replete with 
incidents of beatings delivered by Jewish police and their truncheons, 
Perechodnik restricts himself to euphemistically suggesting that several ghetto 
functionaries enjoyed ‘hunting’ down Jews. Euphemisms regarding violence can 
generally be considered a strategy for obscuring its harm; thus Perechodnik’s 
representational strategy distances himself (and his colleagues) from 
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responsibility for violence. The ambiguous role of the Jewish police in 
deportations also appears in a long chapter entitled ‘The Aktion’, focusing on 
the Ordnungsdienst being forced to help the SS assemble 8,000 Jews for 
deportation to the Treblinka death camp. 
On Wednesday 19 August, 1942, Perechodnik discovered that the Nazis 
planned to liquidate the Ghetto but had promised immunity for ghetto 
functionaries’ families. When the police gathered their relatives outside the 
police station as instructed – Perechodnik had just brought his wife and 
daughter from their cellar hiding place – the Germans moved the crowd to the 
collection point to await the trains, still guaranteeing that the families would be 
separated out and freed. Perechodnik describes the chaos: ‘policemen ran as if 
possessed, not knowing what they had to do – they blew whistles with all their 
strength and without pause.  Everybody feared for himself and his family’.36 The 
Nazis’ promise was soon after exposed as false and the distraught police would 
shortly afterwards watch as their loved ones were taken to their certain deaths. 
First, however, the lie became a half-truth as wives and children were to be 
freed but not parents, whom their sons led to the trains. Of the twenty-seven 
page description devoted to events immediately leading up to and during the 
Ghetto’s liquidation, Perechodnik describes this activity in uncharacteristic 
brevity: 
 
At last a group of policemen’s wives is assembled on the side. They tell 
us to load the remaining people into cattle cars. O cursed Germans! 
How wise are you! How quickly we become the obedient marionettes 
in your hands! We work briskly; the demon of revolt no longer 
dominates us, not even a feeling of pity for the remaining Jews. [...] The 
policemen lead their own fathers and mothers to the cattle cars; 
themselves close the door with a bolt – just as if they were nailing the 
coffins with their own hands.37 
 
The betrayal is then completed as the German perpetrators themselves load the 
remaining Jews into the last wagon, while husbands, fathers, and brothers 
looked on helplessly; ‘marionettes’ evokes their lack of agency. Most of 
Perechodnik’s reflections on this event centre on guilt at failing to save his 
family, and his meditations on what they must have thought about him for this. 
That the Jewish police had earlier been charged with loading the rest of the 
Ghetto’s population into the wagons remains implicit, and his description of 
multiple executions by shooting makes it clear that the German and Ukrainian 
guards held the real power, and prescribed a completely different form of 
violence from the rounding up of Jews by the police. 
Underlining Rozett’s above-mentioned point regarding the principal 
value of Holocaust testimonies residing in their communication of the horror of 
victim experiences, Perechodnik’s account of the Ghetto’s liquidation fittingly 
ensures that the reader’s attention is focused on the trauma experienced by the 
persecuted – the ‘privileged’ Jews who (temporarily) remained behind to clear 
the Ghetto as well as the deportees. Importantly, the manuscript makes clear 
the dehumanising effect of the ethical dilemmas facing ‘privileged’ Jews, with 
Perechodnik describing himself as ‘without feeling about anything’ after losing 
his family.38 Having felt deeply ashamed that he did not, as one colleague and 
friend did, remove his police cap and armband and board the train with his 
family, Perechodnik fluctuates between personal feelings of shame and broader 
condemnations of the Otwock Ordnungsdienst: ‘For three years of occupation 
they sucked Jewish blood, collected constantly a bribe from [...] every Jew who 
traded or who had any goods hidden since before the war’.39 The vampiric 
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imagery here characterises non-physical exploitation as violent, but the use of 
‘they’ attributes this only to his colleagues. 
One significant problem raised by Perechodnik’s acerbic criticism of 
those around him is his characterisation of other victims – not only ‘privileged’ 
colleagues in the Ordnungsdienst, but also Jewish leaders and ‘non-privileged’ 
Jews in the Ghetto – thus underlining the necessity of reading survivor 
testimony with a critical eye. Perechodnik’s frequent negative judgements of 
other Jews contain contradictions, and almost as if projecting his shame onto 
other victims as a coping mechanism, he seems to find it easier to chastise the 
behaviour of Jews in other settings that he did not experience but had heard 
about. For example, while his discussion of the activities of Jewish police in the 
Warsaw Ghetto acknowledges that they were ordered to fill a daily ‘arrest’ quota 
during the several months of deportations to Treblinka, he condemns them 
rather than connect their desperate situation with the ‘choiceless choice’ he 
himself faced: 
 
Their hearts turned to stone; all human feelings became foreign to 
them. They grabbed people, they carried in their arms infants from the 
apartments, they robbed if there was an opportunity. So it was not 
surprising that Jews hated their own police more than they did the 
Germans, more than the Ukrainians.40 
 
The more explicitly violent description of the Warsaw Ghetto police is 
significant, as it creates a strong contrast with Perechodnik’s representation of 
himself and his colleagues during their Ghetto’s liquidation, which is only 
violent through metaphor and euphemism. He is even less generous with some 
Jewish Council officials, who, he writes, ‘died the deserved death of traitors of 
the Jewish people’.41 The Jewish community in general is lambasted on frequent 
occasions, at one point characterising a group of soon-to-be-deported Jews as 
‘huddled like lambs [...] so that the executioners would not have to work too 
hard’.42 Such judgements within the text place the reader in a difficult position, 
requiring them to keep in mind the impossible situation forced onto 
Perechodnik while also having an ethical obligation to doubt, question, and 
resist his inflammatory accusations against other Jews. The problem of 
judgement and the ambiguities of violence in relation to ‘privileged’ Jews can 
also be found in Holocaust testimony relating to the camps, as seen in Paul 
Steinberg’s equally traumatised account of his time as a ‘privileged’ prisoner in 
Auschwitz. 
 
‘Can one be so guilty for having survived?’: Paul Steinberg 
 
Steinberg was an assimilated French Jew deported to Auschwitz when he was 
sixteen years old. Like Perechodnik’s diary, his memoir was published some 
time after the war, though for different reasons. While Perechodnik’s story was 
deemed too inflammatory and censored, Steinberg did not write about his 
experiences until some fifty years after the events due to his trauma; he had 
attempted to do so in the 1960s and could not continue. He notes in the early 
pages of his recollections: ‘The one thing I am sure of is that writing this will 
knock me off balance, deprive me of a fragile equilibrium achieved with the 
utmost care’.43 On occasions like this, Steinberg’s efforts at self-representation 
involve a form of rhetorical ‘violence’ on the self. Counter to the dominant 
discourse surrounding memory, the dredging up of the past is presented as not 
always cathartic and regenerative, a point that becomes increasingly evident in 
Steinberg’s account. 
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In representing the network of prisoners responsible for administration 
and discipline, he at times seems to show an awareness of the inherently 
judgemental role language plays, although his memoir is replete with  
judgements  of various ‘privileged’ inmates that range span admiration, 
condemnation and ambivalence. Writing at length of Hugo, a German-Jewish 
Kapo, who had likely survived three or four years in Buna-Monowitz, rising to 
lead a squad of engineers and chemists, Steinberg writes: 
 
He doesn’t overdo it. He’s a Kapo you can live with. True, he’s in charge 
of a Kommando of considerable value; perhaps in earlier days, with 
other groups, he laid on the stick with proper zeal. He doesn’t treat us 
to the carrot, of course, but relations are rarely tense and sometimes 
almost human.44 
 
This highly significant passage makes it clear that behaviour under Nazi 
persecution conformed to some degree to the perceived necessities of prisoners’ 
situations. Physical violence by prisoner-functionaries was encouraged less 
toward the end of the war, when forced labour was more difficult to locate – 
which also increased the number of Jewish prisoners holding ‘privileged’ 
positions. Significantly, Levi himself notes that Jewish Kapos were arguably 
under more pressure to keep their positions through violence.45 In Steinberg’s 
ambivalent portrayal of Hugo’s violent potential, he emphasises the perverted 
and degrading atmosphere of the camp, while the exact meaning of ‘he doesn’t 
treat us with the carrot, of course’ is left ambiguous. 
 Steinberg’s representation of his own position(s) in the camp is also 
intricate, openly acknowledging the ‘privileges’ his situation afforded him and 
frequently shifting between dismay at his behaviour and self-justification of his 
need to survive however he could. While Steinberg claims that he never 
belonged to the ‘Prominenz [‘Prominents’], the camp aristocracy’, a 
combination of veteran status in the camp (having survived for fifteen months) 
and ‘powerful protectors’ ensured he was considered ‘an influential man’.46 
While noting that he was ‘helplessly kicked around by events’, Steinberg 
concedes that had he been incarcerated in Auschwitz for a longer period of 
time, he ‘would certainly have wound up a senior block inmate, at least’.47 
However, immediately after this statement, he reiterates the importance of 
contextual factors on one’s behaviour: ‘I know from experience that every 
situation in camp is unstable, that someone soaring today can come crashing 
down tomorrow’.48 Steinberg routinely describes his efforts to ensure that 
newly arrived prisoners claimed to have what the Nazis deemed a ‘useful’ 
profession, such as metal worker or carpenter, so that they would not be 
‘selected’ for immediate death in the gas chambers.49 However, he does not 
glamorise what are undeniably acts of resistance by employing a heroic 
discourse, but rather includes this brief description as part of a chapter entitled 
‘The Slap’, which primarily focuses on his abuse of a fellow prisoner and 
inspired the title of this article. 
 After describing the ‘material advantages and some self-satisfaction’ he 
obtained from helping to keep order in his barracks by inspecting bunks, he 
recounts an incident of October 1944 when he ordered an elderly Polish Jew to 
get up and make his bed. When the man responded in Yiddish, Steinberg (who 
did not speak the language) claims to have taken this as a sign of defiant refusal 
and instinctively moved to strike the prisoner. The subsequent fragmentary 
passage, poignantly and significantly written in the present tense, is worth 
quoting in full: 
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Furious, I raise my hand without thinking and slap him. At the last 
moment, I hold back and my hand just grazes his cheek. In that fraction 
of a second, I sound the abyss.  
I see his eyes. Eyes that speak of waiting, resignation, contempt, 
despair.  
Eyes brimming with exhaustion, with disgust at himself and his 
fellowman [sic]. Eyes watching the approach of death with a mixture of 
fear and longing.  
Eyes without tears or reproaches. Just a blink in expectation of a 
slap from a hand. My hand. 
And perhaps all this is sheer invention. Perhaps he was simply 
staring into space, like an animal in an abattoir, and perhaps that 
message in his eyes was my own imagination. My projection onto him of 
all the phantasms teeming inside me. 
Perhaps it was merely the image of what I had been some eight 
months earlier. The approach of my own death, of which I had been 
aware at the time and which I hated at that precise moment. 
If only I could get rid of this memory, sweep it away with my 
hand…50 
 
This intriguing vignette highlights many of the issues we are concerned with 
here, making clear that the violence doubles back on the (oppressed) as well as 
the abuser’s act of violence toward the abused.  
Unlike Perechodnik’s sweeping judgements of Jewish passivity, Steinberg 
hesitates to confidently depict – much less condemn – the ‘passive’ reaction of 
this Polish Jew. It is of crucial ethical importance that Steinberg even questions 
his ability to represent an/other, given the trauma experienced on both sides of 
the slap in the face. Indeed, he begins the following section of his memoir by 
further analysing the incident, stressing that ‘I cannot say what his reaction 
was, whether he got up, whether he made his bed, or what happened to him’.51 
He details his unsuccessful attempt in the 1960s to write a novel called The 
Slap, which drew on this event; the project almost sent him mad and toward 
potential suicide. The narrative of Steinberg’s (ongoing) trauma conflicts with 
his brief guilt-ridden judgement of his own behaviour as akin to that of killers in 
the Cambodian and Rwandan genocides. Carrying the memory of the Polish 
Jew – ‘one of the abject wounds that can never heal’ – with him since their brief 
encounter, his testimony again emphasises the role that the univers 
concentrationnaire52 had on victims. Reflecting a similar sentiment to that of 
Levi’s essay on the ‘grey zone’, Steinberg writes shortly after his description of 
the slap: ‘So the contagion had done its job, and I had not escaped corruption. 
In that world of violence, I’d made a gesture of violence, thus proving that I had 
taken my proper place there’.53 Thus Steinberg holds in balance his own agency 
(‘I’d made a gesture of violence’) and the Nazi ‘contagion’ that is culpable for it. 
Held alongside his account a few chapters earlier of his ‘sole glorious deed’ in 
giving another elderly man his rations,54 the account of ‘the slap’ firmly places 
the reader in the complicated situation of having to navigate the impossible-to-
evaluate intent, volition, and consequences involved in Steinberg’s experiences. 
The intersection between Steinberg and Levi’s writings is much more 
direct than their similar perspectives on the corrupting influence of Auschwitz. 
Indeed, the two prisoners were both held Buna-Monowitz – briefly even as part 
of the same work detail. Unbeknownst to Steinberg at the time, Levi wrote 
about him shortly after the war in his first memoir. Employing the name ‘Henri’ 
as an alias, Levi positions Steinberg as one of four exemplars of the Hobbesian 
camp environment in his testimony’s central chapter, ‘The Drowned and the 
Saved’. Somewhat different from his later call to suspend judgement in ‘The 
Grey Zone’, Levi’s evaluation here is clear-cut in appropriating negative 
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descriptors, militaristic connotations, and biblical metaphor, describing ‘Henri’ 
as ‘intent on his hunt and his struggle; hard and distant, enclosed in armour, 
the enemy of all, inhumanly cunning and incomprehensible like the Serpent in 
Genesis’.55 In what seems a definitive dismissal of Steinberg’s efforts to survive, 
Levi ends his analysis of his ‘case study’ with, ‘I know that Henri is living today. 
I would give much to know his life as a free man, but I do not want to see him 
again’.56  
Significantly, Steinberg’s aptly titled memoir, Speak You Also (published 
almost half a decade after Levi’s judgement) responds to the now-deceased 
survivor without anger or denial. Steinberg interrupts his mostly chronological 
narrative with short chapters (‘Digressions’) one of which is positioned directly 
after ‘The Slap’ and addresses Levi’s representation. Steinberg notes that he was 
only eighteen when they were acquainted (four years younger than Levi had 
claimed). Yet fluctuating between self-justification and despair, Steinberg 
mournfully writes that Levi 
  
must have been right. I probably was that creature obsessed with 
staying alive. […] Now I feel a sharp sense of regret. Primo Levi is gone, 
and I’d never realized what he thought of me. […] Maybe I could have 
persuaded him to change his verdict by showing that there were 
extenuating circumstances […] Can one be so guilty for having 
survived?57 
 
The precariousness of the act of passing judgement is particularly evident in the 
fact that Steinberg agrees with Levi’s portrayal at times, calling him a ‘neutral’ 
and ‘surely objective observer’58 – a characterisation that readers familiar to 
both testimonies might readily (and respectfully) disagree with. Steinberg 
writes as if Levi had presided over a full, criminal trial, resulting in a guilty 
‘verdict’, which underscores the seriousness and finality of the judgement. 
Exemplifying the ethical dilemmas confronting ‘privileged’ Jews, Steinberg’s 
detailed and traumatised narrative of his desperate efforts to stay alive through 
various ‘privileged’ means situates him firmly within the ‘grey zone’ of moral 




Our analysis of the testimonies of former ‘privileged’ Jews reveals that Calel 
Perechodnik and Paul Steinberg employ representational strategies that 
(inevitably) pass judgement. Deeply traumatised and refusing to absolve 
himself of his ‘complicity’, Perechodnik nonetheless portrays his own violence, 
and that of his colleagues, through metaphor or euphemism, while making 
explicit judgements of Jewish police, council leaders, and other victims in other 
ghettos. By contrast, Steinberg directly attributes agency for violence to 
himself, while simultaneously highlighting the Nazi influence that ‘corrupted’ 
him. The periodic fluctuations between self-justification, self-loathing and 
despair in both testimonies highlight the ethical dilemmas that these victims 
faced. As Steinberg suggests, the camp and ghetto environments provided 
‘extenuating’, although not exculpatory, circumstances, given the harm that 
(some of) their actions caused to fellow prisoners. The issue of how to 
understand – how to judge – these actions is a vexed one. 
Exploring the devastating impact of the Holocaust on pre-existing moral 
frameworks, John K. Roth stresses the need to ‘reconsider and retrieve ethics, 
to recover and renew its vitality in the ruins of a post-Holocaust world’.59 
Holocaust testimony is clearly one crucial avenue through which to attempt 
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this, and more research into the ambiguities of violence in  
(self-)representations of ‘privileged’ prisoners in the ghettos and camps is 
needed. An ethics of reading traumatised accounts of so-called ‘moral 
compromise’ by victims whose freedom of choice dissipated with the extremity 
of their unprecedented persecution is paramount, with acknowledgement of 
the interrelated problems of judgement and representation necessary to avoid 
overlooking the ‘choiceless choices’ confronted by these figures of the ‘grey 
zone’. The ‘privileged’ positions that numerous victims held must always be 
considered in the context of the ‘divide and conquer’ practices of the Nazi 
perpetrators; and the extreme situations these engendered in the camps and 
ghettos. As a result of these settings, various forms of violence can be found in 
the experiences of Perechodnik and Steinberg, and their testimonies (along 
with Levi’s) must be looked on with a critical eye – but also with pity and 
compassion. Doing so will only contribute to a deepening of understandings of 
the Holocaust: by attending to the traumas of both abused and abuser in the 
realm of ‘privilege’ and ‘compromise’, one might glimpse a reflection of the 
other side of a slap in the face. 
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